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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant/cross-appellee Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation ("Westinghouse") appeals an order of the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
denying Westinghouse's post-trial motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict,1 a new trial or a remittitur of 
damages on appellee/cross-appellant John D. Starceski's 
("Starceski") claim for violations of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. (West 1985 & 
Supp. 1994).  Starceski cross-appeals other parts of the same 
order that denied his motions for pre-judgment interest and 
reinstatement. 
 We will affirm the district court's denial of 
Westinghouse's post-trial motions.  The record is not critically 
deficient of evidence from which a jury might have reasonably 
found that Westinghouse discriminated against Starceski because 
of age, nor does it appear that the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing Westinghouse's motions for a new trial or 
                     
1
.  The motion for judgment n.o.v. is now one of three motions 
called a motion for "judgment as a matter of law."  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 50(a).  The other two correspond to the motion for a 
directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case (in some 
systems once called a motion for an involuntary non-suit) and the 
motion for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)-(b), as amended in 1991. 
  
remittitur.  We also reject Westinghouse's objections to the 
district court's Price Waterhouse "mixed-motives" instruction and 
its challenge to the jury's finding it willfully discriminated 
against Starceski. 
 On Starceski's cross-appeal from the denial of his 
motions for pre-judgment interest and reinstatement, we will 
vacate the district court's order denying Starceski's motion for 
pre-judgment interest and remand for the purpose of calculating 
the interest due and adding it to his judgment; but we will 
affirm the district court's refusal to grant him reinstatement.  
An award of pre-judgment interest together with an award of 
liquidated damages is not a double recovery.  The two serve 
different purposes and work together to facilitate the ADEA's 
"make-whole" purpose.  Finally, we hold that the district court 
did not err in concluding that reinstatement is inappropriate 
under the circumstances. 
 
 I.  Statement of Facts and Procedural History 
 In April 1989, Westinghouse terminated Starceski from 
his senior engineer position after thirty-six years of service.  
When terminated, Starceski was about one month short of his 
sixty-fourth birthday. 
 Starceski worked for Westinghouse from 1951 to 1953 and 
from 1956 to March 1981 as an engineer in its Bettis Atomic Power 
Laboratory.2  In March 1981, Westinghouse transferred him to its 
                     
2
.  From about 1954 to 1956, Starceski worked for Sikorski 
Aircraft. 
  
Nuclear Services Division ("NSD").  There he was responsible, 
among other things, for the design, building and upgrading of 
tools to repair reactor components in nuclear power plants.  In 
early 1985, Starceski began reporting to Richard Saul, a 
first-level supervisor, whom Westinghouse terminated in February 
1989.  Starceski thereafter reported directly to Ali Jaafar, the 
second-level manager who had been Saul's supervisor. 
 In late 1988, Jaafar received a directive to reduce his 
staff by about eighteen people during the following year.  Saul 
testified that, in an October 1988 staff meeting, Jaafar directed 
the first-level managers to transfer work from older to younger 
employees and to rank employees by their value to the group.  
According to Saul, Jaafar also instructed him to "doctor" 
Starceski's evaluation to reflect poor performance.  Starceski 
stated that once these orders were given, he was not given any 
new assignments and work was also taken away from other older 
colleagues, sometimes immediately after being assigned to them. 
 In March 1989, Starceski and five other engineers were 
informed that their services were no longer needed.  Five of 
these six were in ADEA's protected age group.  Their average age 
was fifty-one.  The average age of the remaining engineers in the 
department was thirty-nine.  The youngest member of the six was 
ultimately retained by Westinghouse, along with others who ranked 
lower than Starceski in performance according to Saul's 
evaluation. 
 On March 13, 1991, Starceski filed this action against 
Westinghouse alleging that it terminated him on the basis of age 
  
in violation of the ADEA.  Westinghouse stipulated that 
Starceski's job performance was not a factor in his layoff, but 
contended that it was part of a reduction in force and a lack of 
work for persons with Starceski's skills.  The district court 
initially granted Westinghouse's motion for summary judgment, but 
Starceski appealed to this Court, and we reversed and remanded 
the case for trial.  Starceski v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 
No. 92-3552 (3d Cir. April 19, 1993). 
 On February 11, 1994, a jury returned a general verdict 
awarding Starceski compensatory damages of $267,268.55.   
Immediately after the jury's verdict was announced, counsel for 
Starceski requested reinstatement.  The district court denied 
this request.  It then charged the jury on willfulness.  The jury 
found that Westinghouse had willfully discriminated against 
Starceski on the basis of age.  This doubled Starceski's 
compensatory damages giving him an award totalling $651,910.68 
after counsel fees and costs were added. 
 Post-trial, Starceski asked for the addition of 
pre-judgment interest and reinstatement.  Westinghouse, on the 
other hand, filed a motion it called a "motion for judgment 
n.o.v."3 or, in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur.  The 
district court denied Westinghouse's motions and Starceski's 
request for pre-judgment interest and reinstatement.  This timely 
appeal and cross-appeal followed. 
                     
3
.  We will hereafter refer to this motion as a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.  See supra n.1. 
  
 
 II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
 In reviewing a district court's ruling on a post-trial 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, this Court applies the 
same standard as the district court.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted); Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 
1992).  We view the record in the light most favorable to the 
verdict winner, and affirm the denial "'unless the record "is 
critically deficient of that minimum quantum of evidence from 
which a jury might reasonably afford relief."'"  Rotondo, 956 
F.2d at 438 (quoting Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 959 
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 and Denneny v. Siegel, 
407 F.2d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1969)); Keith v. Truck Stops Corp. of 
America, 909 F.2d 743, 744-45 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); 
Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 
(3d Cir. 1986).  In other words, the court must determine whether 
a reasonable jury could have found for the prevailing party.  
Newman v. Exxon Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (D. Del. 1989), 
aff'd, 904 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for 
a new trial or remittitur, we ask generally whether the district 
court abused its discretion, but if the court's denial of the 
motion is based on application of a legal precept, our review is 
  
plenary and, in addition, any findings of fact on which the 
court's exercise of discretion depends are reviewed for clear 
error.  See Rotondo, 956 F.2d at 438 (citing Link, 788 F.2d at 
921). 
 
 III.  Discussion 
 Westinghouse raises several challenges to the district 
court's denial of its post-trial motions.  It asserts that 
(1) the district court improperly gave the jury a so-called 
"mixed-motives" instruction, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 (1989); (2) the district court erred in upholding the 
jury's finding that Westinghouse had failed to sustain its Price 
Waterhouse burden of proving that Starceski would have been 
terminated regardless of his age; (3) there was insufficient 
evidence to uphold the jury's finding of a willful ADEA 
violation; and (4) a remittitur was necessary because there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's damages award. 
 On his cross-appeal, Starceski argues that the district 
court should have granted his motion for pre-judgment interest 
and reinstatement.  We will first discuss Westinghouse's 
arguments and then Starceski's cross-appeal. 
 
 A.  Pretext and "Mixed-Motives" 
 Before submitting the case to the jury, the district 
court determined that Starceski provided sufficient direct 
evidence to support a claim of age-based disparate treatment 
requiring a Price Waterhouse, or so-called "mixed-motives" 
  
instruction, rather than a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973) and 450 U.S. 248 (1981), pretext instruction.4  
Westinghouse contends that the decision of the district court to 
charge the jury on "mixed-motives" was not in accord with the law 
and, because of its timing, substantially prejudiced 
Westinghouse.  We disagree. 
                     
4
.  The difference between the burden-shifting framework of a 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine pretext case and a Price Waterhouse 
"mixed-motives" employment discrimination case has been the 
subject of much comment since St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (itself a pretext case) and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, which 
codified Price Waterhouse's "mixed-motives" standard at 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 1994).  See Mardell v. Harleysville 
Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (3d Cir. 1994).  We review 
the problem briefly.  An employment discrimination case may be 
advanced on either a pretext or "mixed-motives" theory.  In a 
pretext case, once the employee has made a prima facie showing of 
discrimination, the burden of going forward shifts to the 
employer who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment decision.  McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.  If the employer does 
produce evidence showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the discharge, the burden of production shifts back to the 
employee who must show that the employer's proffered explanation 
is incredible.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; Armbruster v. Unisys 
Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1994); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 
F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
at 802).  At all times the burden of proof or risk of 
non-persuasion, including the burden of proving "but for" 
causation or causation in fact, remains on the employee.  
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.  In a 
"mixed-motives" or Price Waterhouse case, the employee must 
produce direct evidence of discrimination, i.e., more direct 
evidence than is required for the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima 
facie case.  Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1225 n.6; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 
778.  If the employee does produce direct evidence of 
discriminatory animus, the employer must then produce evidence 
sufficient to show that it would have made the same decision if 
illegal bias had played no role in the employment decision.  
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45; Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1225 
n.6.  In short, direct proof of discriminatory animus leaves the 
employer only an affirmative defense on the question of "but for" 
cause or cause in fact. 
  
 In Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d 
Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993), 
overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., No. 93-1773, 
1995 WL 21907 (3d Cir. 1995) (in banc), we stated that a charge 
on a "mixed-motives" theory of employment discrimination requires 
"conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking 
process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged 
discriminatory attitude."5   See also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, 
Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).  More recently, in Armbruster v. 
Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1994), we made the following 
observations concerning the difference between a McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine pretext case and a Price Waterhouse 
"mixed-motives" case: 
 [I]n a [mixed-motives] case unaffected by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the evidence the 
plaintiff produces is so revealing of 
discriminatory animus that it is not 
necessary to rely on any presumption from the 
prima facie case [as is necessary in a 
pretext action] to shift the burden of 
production.  Both the burden of production 
and the risk of non-persuasion are shifted to 
the defendant who . . . must persuade the 
factfinder that[,] even if discrimination was 
a motivating factor in the adverse employment 
decision, it would have made the same 
employment decision regardless of its 
discriminatory animus. 
                     
5
.  In Miller, supra, we rejected the statement in Griffiths that 
an employee advancing a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine pretext theory 
must show that invidious discrimination is the "sole cause" of 
his employer's adverse action.  Miller, 1995 WL 21907, at *22 
n.8.  However, we relied upon Griffiths's description of the type 
of evidence that is needed to show a Price Waterhouse 
"mixed-motives" case.  Miller, 1995 WL 21907, at *11 n.9. 
  
 
 
Id. at 778 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-46 and 
Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 469-70 and n.12) (emphasis added).  See 
also Miller, 1995 WL 21907, at *7.  In her concurrence in Price 
Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor offered guidance on the type of 
evidence needed to make out a "mixed-motives" case.  She 
reasoned: 
 [S]tray remarks in the workplace, while 
perhaps probative of [a discriminatory 
animus], cannot justify requiring the 
employer to prove that its [employment] 
decisions were based on legitimate criteria.  
Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or 
statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the 
decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy 
the plaintiff's burden in this regard; . . . 
What is required is . . . direct evidence 
that decisionmakers placed substantial 
negative reliance on an illegitimate 
criterion in reaching their decision. 
 
 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); Armbruster, 32 F.3d 
at 778. 
 In applying this standard to Starceski's case, we are 
drawn at once to the testimony of Saul, who was once Starceski's 
first-level manager at Westinghouse.  Saul testified that Jaafar, 
a second-level manager responsible for the layoff decision 
affecting Starceski, gave orders to him and other supervisors 
under himin preparation for a work force reduction directed 
by higher managementto consider age in the assignment of 
work.  Saul specifically testified that Jaafar, at a meeting 
  
concerning the impending reduction, told the first-level managers 
to transfer work from older to younger employees.  Saul also 
testified that he discussed Jaafar's comments with other managers 
after the meeting and they took Jaafar's statements as an order 
to set up older employees for termination in the impending work 
force reduction.  Saul said "it was actually a fact that the 
older engineers or the senior people [were] going to be let go in 
'89."  Joint Appendix ("App.") at 446.  Saul also testified that 
Jaafar instructed him to "doctor" Starceski's performance 
appraisals so that they would reflect poor performance.  These 
directives from Jaafar to Saul and other first-level managers are 
precisely the kind of evidence that is needed to indicate "that 
[the] decisionmakers [involved here] placed substantial negative 
reliance on an illegitimate criterion [i.e., age] in reaching 
their [termination] decision."  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 
375 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 
F.2d 1176, 1186-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 
(1992)).6 
 In Hook, we quoted with approval the following passage 
from the Second Circuit's opinion in Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual 
Insurance Companies: 
                     
6
.  To be sure, the jury was faced with conflicting testimony as 
to whether Jaafar gave these directives.  We are obliged, 
however, to view the evidence and review the record in the light 
most favorable to Starceski, the verdict winner.  We must 
therefore assume that Jaafar gave these orders.  See Radabaugh v. 
Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 450 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation 
omitted).   
  
 "[P]urely statistical evidence would not 
warrant [a Price Waterhouse 'mixed-motives'] 
charge; nor would evidence merely of the 
plaintiff's qualification for and 
availability of a given position; nor would 
'stray' remarks in the workplace by persons 
who are not involved in the pertinent 
decisionmaking process. . . .  If however, 
the plaintiff's nonstatistical evidence is 
directly tied to the forbidden animus, for 
example[,] policy documents or statements of 
a person involved in the decisionmaking 
process that reflect a discriminatory or 
retaliatory animus of the type complained of 
in the suit, that plaintiff is entitled to a 
burden-shifting instruction." 
 
 
28 F.2d at 374 (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 
1992)); see also Glover v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 981 F.2d 388, 
394 (8th Cir. 1992) (statements demonstrating that a work force 
reduction was "designed, in part, to eliminate older employees," 
entitled plaintiff to a mixed-motives charge), vacated on other 
grounds, 114 S. Ct. 42 (1993).  Because Starceski introduced 
evidence of this type, the district court did not err in giving 
the jury a "mixed-motives" instruction.  Cf. Hook, 28 F.3d at 375 
(finding sexual comments by plaintiff's supervisor insufficient 
for a "mixed-motives" charge because they had nothing to do with 
plaintiff's job performance and were unrelated to the adverse 
decision process challenged in the case). 
 We disagree, however, with the sweeping statement of 
the court of appeals in Glover that: 
 [a]s a general rule, we [sh]ould expect that 
all successfully prosecuted age 
discrimination cases involving a reduction in 
force would involve mixed-motives because the 
plaintiff would be alleging the employer had 
both a legitimate reason (the economic need 
  
to reduce the workforce) and an illegitimate 
reason (to terminate an employee based on his 
or her age). 
 
 
Glover, 981 F.2d at 394.  This statement, which could force every 
case into the Price Waterhouse framework, strikes us as an 
unfortunate consequence of the use of the phrase "mixed-motives" 
to capture the Price Waterhouse rationale. 
 We believe, on the other hand, that the distinction 
between a Price Waterhouse and a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine case 
lies in the kind of proof the employee produces on the issue of 
bias.  In the former, direct evidence of discriminatory animus 
leads not only to a ready logical inference of bias, but also to 
a rational presumption that the person expressing bias acted on 
it.  As Chief Justice Vinson put it in, Avery v. Georgia, 345 
U.S. 559, 562 (1953), he who has a mind to discriminate is likely 
to do so.  A pretext case is different.  It depends on 
circumstantial evidence allowing the factfinder to infer that the 
falsity of the employer's explanation shows bias.  The inference 
from Saul's testimony that bias against older employees played a 
substantial part in the selection of those employees who would be 
discharged is direct and inescapable.  The district court did not 
err when it gave the jury a Price Waterhouse instruction. 
 Westinghouse, however, contends that, even if there was 
sufficient evidence to warrant a Price Waterhouse instruction, it 
should not have been given here because the district court abused 
its discretion when it allowed Starceski, after all the evidence 
was in, to change his theory of recovery from pretext under 
  
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine to "mixed-motives" under Price 
Waterhouse.  Westinghouse argues that the district court should 
have made a decision or forced an election on pretext or 
"mixed-motives" at the beginning of the case and that its failure 
to do so was so prejudicial that Westinghouse is entitled to a 
new trial.  This contention lacks merit.7  In Armbruster we said: 
 an employee [need not] elect to proceed on 
either a pretext or a Price Waterhouse theory 
at trial.  Rather, we think that an employee 
may present his case under both theories and 
the district court must then decide whether 
one or both theories properly apply at some 
point in the proceedings prior to instructing 
the jury.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 
U.S. at 247 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 12; 
id. at 278, 109 S.Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring); Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 472; see 
also Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 185. 
 
 
32 F.3d at 782 n.17 (emphasis added).  See also  Radabaugh, 994 
F.2d at 448 ("Whether a case is a pretext case or mixed-motives 
case is a question for the court once all the evidence has been 
received."); Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 186 ("jury [should] be 
instructed on the law, including the possibility of 
burden-shifting, before it begins its factfinding").8 
 Accordingly, we hold that the district court's decision 
to give the jury a "mixed-motives" instruction, made shortly 
                     
7
.  Starceski contends that Westinghouse waived this objection.  
We reject that argument.  We believe Westinghouse's objection to 
the charge was sufficient to preserve this issue. 
8
.  As a practical matter, the proofs required to defend this 
case under either a pretext or "mixed-motives" theory differed 
little.  The effect is a shift in the burden, not the substance 
of the proofs.  See supra n.4. 
  
before the case went to the jury, does not entitle Westinghouse 
to a new trial. 
 
 B.  Westinghouse's Price Waterhouse Affirmative Defense 
 Having found that age played a role in Westinghouse's 
decision to discharge Starceski, Price Waterhouse then required 
the jury to decide whether Westinghouse sustained its burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
terminated Starceski even if it had not discriminated.  Hook, 28 
F.3d at 368.  In other words, the risk of non-persuasion, as well 
as the burden of production, was now on Westinghouse to prove 
that it would have fired Starceski anyway, without regard to his 
age. 
 Westinghouse stipulated that Starceski was not 
terminated because of poor job performance, the usual defense in 
this kind of a case, but argued instead that there was no work at 
Westinghouse which Starceski could do.  Starceski, however, had 
produced evidence tending to show Westinghouse still had work he 
could do when it terminated him.  The jury believed Starceski.  
It found that Westinghouse did not meet its burden of proving 
that the company would have discharged Starceski even if it had 
not considered his age.  After reviewing the evidence presented 
at trial, we cannot say that it does not rationally support this 
finding.  Evidence will support a jury verdict "if reasonable 
persons could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from it."  
Gilkerson v. Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1985) 
  
(citations omitted).9  Westinghouse, therefore, is not entitled 
to either judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the issue 
of unlawful age discrimination. 
 
 IV.  Was Westinghouse's ADEA Violation Willful? 
 Westinghouse next contends that the district court 
erred in upholding the jury's finding of willfulness.  
Willfulness is significant because the ADEA provides double 
damages when the employer's discriminatory conduct is willful.  
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b).  The double recovery is punitive and is 
intended to deter willful conduct.  Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985). 
 An ADEA violation is willful if the employer either 
"knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its 
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA."  Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 
113 S. Ct. 1701, 1710 (1993).  In Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court 
rejected any requirement of "direct" evidence of discrimination, 
"outrageous" conduct by the employer10 or proof that age was the 
                     
9
.  We have considered Westinghouse's argument that certain time 
sheets, identifying work that Starceski could have performed when 
it terminated him, were improperly admitted into evidence under 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule but conclude 
this argument lacks merit.  A proper foundation was laid for the 
admission of these documents and they were properly admitted 
under Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits 
the admission of documents prepared in the ordinary course of 
business, even if the individual who prepared them does not 
testify about their contents.  See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).   
10
.  This rejection of the "outrageous" standard effectively 
overrules our decisions in Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 
879 F.2d 43, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1989) and Dreyer v. Arco Chemical 
  
predominant rather than a determinative factor in the employment 
decision.  Id.; Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 722 
n.9 (1st Cir. 1994).  In addressing willfulness after Hazen 
Paper, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reasoned that 
the "question is not whether the evidence used to establish 
willfulness is different from and additional to the evidence used 
to establish a violation of the ADEA, but whether the 
evidenceadditional or otherwisesatisfies the distinct 
standard used for establishing willfulness."  Brown v. Stites 
Concrete, Inc., 994 F.2d 553, 560 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 In the instant case, the district court reasoned: 
 [T]he evidence was undisputed that Mr. 
Ali Jaafar was defendant's management 
personnel with final decisionmaking authority 
over plaintiff's layoff.  Plaintiff's 
evidence, through his then supervisor, Mr. 
Dick Saul, was that several months prior to 
the planned layoff, Mr. Jaafar told Mr. Saul 
to set up the "senior" engineers in 
plaintiff's department for permanent layoff.  
Mr. Saul testified that the clear meaning of 
Mr. Jaafar's instructions was that the older 
engineers in plaintiff's department were to 
be specifically targeted for permanent 
layoff.  Mr. Saul further testified that 
thereafter, Mr. Jaafar directed him to 
artificially lower plaintiff's performance 
evaluation. 
 
 
Starceski v. Westinghouse, No. 91-0454, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Pa. 
March 14, 1994).11  We again acknowledge the conflicting 
(..continued) 
Co., 801 F.2d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 
(1987). 
11
.  The record also shows that five of the six individuals 
selected for layoff were in the protected age group, and 
  
testimony on whether Jaafar gave these orders, but state again 
that we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Starceski, the verdict winner. See Radabaugh, 997 
F.2d at 450.  Looking at the record in this way, Westinghouse's 
position that the violation resulted from no more than accident, 
inadvertence or ordinary negligence is factually incorrect.  See 
Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 721-22.12  On this record, a jury acting 
reasonably could find that Westinghouse either "knew or showed 
reckless disregard" for its statutory duty to avoid 
discriminating against Starceski because of his age.13  
(..continued) 
Starceski was the oldest.  The average age of those laid off was 
fifty-one.  The average age of those retained was thirty-nine. 
12
.  We reject Westinghouse's argument that Jaafar's intent 
cannot be imputed to it.  Jaafar was a second level manager and 
was the final decision maker on the selection of people for 
termination.  Therefore, his intent is imputed to the company 
both for the purpose of determining whether the Act was violated 
and for the purpose of determining whether that violation was 
willful.  See Crawford v. West Jersey Health Systems, 847 
F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D.N.J. 1994) (test for determining agency is 
whether "the alleged agent has 'participated in the decision-
making process that forms the basis of the discrimination'") 
(quoting Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986)).   
    We also reject Westinghouse's contention that the district 
court erred in admitting a list of employees in Starceski's 
department, which was prepared at the request of the EEOC and 
contained the employees' ages and indicated who had been selected 
for layoff, but then excluding the EEOC determination that 
Starceski's administrative charge lacked probable cause.  
Admission of the EEOC decision on probable cause and its file is 
entrusted to the discretion of the district court.  Walton v. 
Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1977) (upholding the trial 
court's refusal to admit portions of the EEOC file).  We cannot 
say that the district court abused its discretion here. 
13
.  The dissenting opinion contends that Jaafar's statements 
were insufficient to show that Westinghouse acted willfully.  In 
doing so, the dissenting opinion in footnote 2 disclaims any need 
to consider whether Jaafar's "conduct could be attributed to 
  
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's denial of 
Westinghouse's motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new 
trial on willfulness. 
 
(..continued) 
Westinghouse."  It concludes that a jury finding that Jaafar may 
have discriminated is not proof that Westinghouse knew or 
approved Jaafar's act.  In this respect, the dissenting opinion 
fails to give Starceski, as the verdict winner, the benefit of 
all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence.  
One such inference from Saul's testimony about Jaafar's remarks 
is that Westinghouse knew of or showed reckless disregard for its 
duties under the ADEA.  Under the usual standards governing the 
interpretation of a verdict speaking generally to any issue, we 
should assume the jury so found.  Thus, our analysis does not 
disturb the two-tier rule as the dissenting opinion suggests.  
  
 V.  Remittitur 
 Finally, Westinghouse contends the jury's verdict 
should be reduced because (1) Starceski testified he was not able 
to work in 1993 because of an emotional disability; and (2) there 
was an insufficient basis in the record to make a precise 
determination of lost pension benefits. 
 An ADEA claimant is entitled to be made whole for 
losses sustained as a result of a wrongful termination.  
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Maxfield v. 
Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 1057 (1986).  An ADEA claimant, however, is generally 
not entitled to a recovery in excess of make-whole damages.  Id.  
A remittitur is in order when a trial judge concludes that a jury 
verdict is "clearly unsupported" by the evidence and exceeds the 
amount needed to make the plaintiff whole, i.e., to remedy the 
effect of the employer's discrimination.  Spence v. Board of 
Educ. of Christina School Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 
1986); Brunnemann v. Terra Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 178 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (A remittitur may be granted if a jury's award is  
"excessive or so large as to appear contrary to right reason.").   
The trial judge's decision to grant or withhold a remittitur 
cannot be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.  
Spence, 806 F.2d at 1201 (citing Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 
F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) and Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc. 
CIE. Chambon Maclovia S.A., 562 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1977)).  This 
deferential standard is corollary to the recognition that the 
trial judge "is in the best position to evaluate the evidence 
  
presented and determine whether or not the jury has come to a 
rationally based conclusion."  Id. (citing Murray, 610 F.2d at 
152-53). 
 In this case, the jury returned a general verdict.  The 
law "presumes the existence of fact findings implied from the 
jury's having reached that verdict."  Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. 
A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1516 (Fed Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 871 (1984).  The district court considered how the jury 
could have rationally arrived at its damage award, reasoning: 
 The award clearly reflects that the jury 
awarded plaintiff the $223,616.60 he claimed 
in lost wages and saving plan 
contributions. . . .  The jury then added 
plaintiff's claim for lost pension 
contributions in the amount of 
$51,766.95. . . .  The jury obviously 
rejected, and therefore subtracted, 
plaintiff's claim for "unreimbursed expenses" 
for 1989 and 1990 in the amounts of $3,649 
and $4,466 respectively [for a total of 
$267,268.55.] 
 
 
Starceski, No. 91-0454, slip op. at 6-7. 
 We have recognized that "[t]rial courts and the parties 
themselves invariably lack perfect hindsight to forecast what 
would have happened had there been no unlawful acts."  Rodriquez 
v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 
U.S. 913 (1978); International Broth. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977) ("process of recreating the past 
will necessarily involve a degree of approximation and 
imprecision").  We have concluded, however, that this "risk of 
lack of certainty with respect to projections of lost income must 
  
be borne by the wrongdoer, not the victim."  Goss v. Exxon Office 
Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Story 
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931)); Mason 
v. Association for Independent Growth, 817 F. Supp. 550, 555 
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (same). 
 Westinghouse, however, contends that Starceski had 
family obligations and concerns that precluded him from working 
during 1993, and that the record does not provide any basis for 
the calculation of lost pension benefits.  Thus, to the extent 
the damage award includes recovery for these injuries, 
Westinghouse asks that it be reduced.  "[A]s a general rule, [an 
employment discrimination plaintiff] will not be allowed back pay 
during any periods of disability" and "an employer who has 
discriminated need not reimburse the plaintiff for salary loss 
attributable to the plaintiff and unrelated to the employment 
discrimination."  Mason, 817 F. Supp. at 554.  In Starceski's 
case, Westinghouse had the burden of establishing a failure to 
mitigate, see Robinson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. 
Authority, Red Arrow Div., 982 F.2d 892, 897 (3d Cir. 1993), and 
it failed to persuade the jurors that Starceski was unable to 
continue working at Westinghouse in 1993 as a result of his 
family problems. 
 Westinghouse also contends that Starceski's proof 
relating to his pension benefits fails because he did not take 
into account the effect of a plan modification.  We also reject 
this argument.  Though Westinghouse may have modified its pension 
program during the course of this dispute, it never produced any 
  
documents showing the effect of the modifications on Starceski's 
pension.  In the absence of evidence concerning the effect of the 
changes the jury was free to draw its own inferences from 
Starceski's evidence concerning the benefits he was entitled to 
under the original plan.  See E.E.O.C. v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, 
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without 
opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 
(1977). 
 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Westinghouse's motion for remittitur.  The damages awarded 
Starceski were neither excessive as a matter of law nor "clearly 
unsupported" by the record.  See Brunnemann, 975 F.2d at 178 ("A 
verdict is excessive as a matter of law if shown to exceed 'any 
rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based 
upon the evidence before the jury.'") (quotation omitted).  We 
therefore affirm the district court's denial of Westinghouse's 
motion for a remittitur of damages. 
 Having considered all of Westinghouse's challenges to 
the denial of its post-trial motions, we turn to Starceski's 
cross-appeal. 
 
 VI.  Starceski's Cross-Appeal 
 Starceski asserts that the district erred in denying 
his motion for pre-judgment interest and reinstatement.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we will vacate the district court's 
denial of pre-judgment interest, but affirm its refusal to grant 
reinstatement. 
  
 
 A.  Pre-Judgment Interest 
 The district court reasoned that an award of 
pre-judgment interest is precluded in an ADEA case when 
liquidated damages are awarded for willfulness "because the 
purpose of liquidated damages [like pre-judgment interest] 
is . . . to compensate plaintiff for the loss of the use of his 
funds up to trial, [making] an award for both liquidated damages 
and prejudgment interest . . . double compensation for the same 
loss."  Starceski, No. 91-0454, slip op. at 8. 
 As the district court recognized, this Court has not 
yet decided whether pre-judgment interest may be awarded along 
with liquidated damages.  The courts of appeals that have decided 
this issue are divided.  Compare Criswell v. Western Airlines, 
Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1983) (liquidated damages 
and pre-judgment interest serve different functions in making 
ADEA plaintiffs whole), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 400 
(1985); Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta, P.C., 818 
F.2d 278, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); Lindsey v. American Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1102 (11th Cir. 1987) (same); with 
Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 1990) (an 
award of liquidated damages precludes recovery of pre-judgment 
interest as that would constitute double recovery); Hamilton v. 
1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); 
Burns v. Texas City Refining, Inc., 890 F.2d 747, 752-53 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (same); Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 
1336-37 (7th Cir. 1987) (same), vacated on other grounds, 486 
  
U.S. 1020 (1988); Rose v. National Cash Register Corp., 703 F.2d 
225, 230 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); 
Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(same); Blim v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479-80 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984). 
 This circuit split is a consequence of two competing 
theories concerning Congress's purpose in providing liquidated 
damages for willful violations of the ADEA.  We think the Supreme 
Court's decision in Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125, guides us in 
answering this question.  There it stated that liquidated damages 
are punitive in nature and designed to deter willful conduct.  If 
awards of pre-judgment interest are compensatory, and liquidated 
damages are punitive, a concomitant grant of both is appropriate 
because pre-judgment interest serves the statutory goal of making 
Starceski whole, i.e., it compensates him for the discriminatory 
wrong that he has suffered, while liquidated damages would punish 
Westinghouse, the wrongdoer, for its willful violation of the 
ADEA.  Accordingly, we reject the reasoning of those courts that 
believe Congress intended to incorporate into the ADEA all of the 
damage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 
including its prohibition of concomitant awards for pre-judgment 
interest and liquidated damages.  See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. 
O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945) (FLSA plaintiff cannot recover 
both liquidated damages and pre-judgment interest because the 
  
former serve "as compensation for delay in payment of sums due 
under the Act").14 
 Rather, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the courts 
of appeals for the second, ninth and eleventh circuits, who rely 
on Thurston, supra, to permit awards of both liquidated damages 
and pre-judgment interest.15  After Thurston, this Court held 
                     
14
.  The ADEA incorporates the FLSA's liquidated damages 
provision, but adds a requirement of "willful" conduct.  
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b).  For a general discussion of the 
legislative history showing Congress's selective incorporation of 
FLSA provisions into the ADEA, see Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 
Inc., 24 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1994). 
15
.  Although the courts of appeals for the sixth, eighth and 
tenth circuits have determined that an ADEA plaintiff cannot 
recover both liquidated damages and pre-judgment interest, these 
courts rendered their decisions before Thurston and, as of yet, 
have not revisited this issue in light of Thurston's statement 
that liquidated damages are punitive in nature.  See, e.g., Smith 
v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1467 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(question not properly before the Court because party appealing 
agreed with district court that after Thurston liquidated damages 
were not a bar to pre-judgment interest, casting doubt on the 
circuit's decision in Gibson).  The Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, one of those that had originally decided an 
ADEA plaintiff could not recover both liquidated damages and 
pre-judgment interest, overruled its prior decision after 
Thurston, reasoning: 
 
  The Thurston decision . . . confirms the 
Ninth Circuit's approach in Criswell and 
undermines the assumptions of the other 
circuits' decisions, including ours in 
O'Donnell.  See Bonura v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A., 629 F.Supp. 353, 363-66 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (Thurston clarifies "that prejudgment 
interest does not provide a double recovery 
to victims of age discrimination who have 
proven their entitlement to liquidated 
damages as well as back-pay."). 
 
Lindsey, 810 F.2d at 1102 n.7. 
  
that liquidated damages are punitive in nature.  See Turner v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 346 (3d Cir. 1990); Blum v. 
Witco Chemical Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 382 (3d Cir. 1987); Rickel v. 
C.I.R., 900 F.2d 655, 666 (3d Cir. 1990).  We have also 
recognized that the purpose of an award of pre-judgment interest 
is "'to reimburse the claimant for the loss of the use of its 
investment or its funds from the time of the loss until judgment 
is entered.'"  Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., 
789 F.2d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Arco Pipeline Co. v. SS 
Trade Star, 693 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1982)).  We are unable to 
reconcile Thurston's statement that liquidated damages are 
punitive with a denial of pre-judgment interest designed to 
compensate for loss of the time value of money.  Thus, we are not 
persuaded by the reasoning of those courts of appeals which 
believe that Congress's incorporation of some of the FLSA's 
damage provisions into the ADEA was meant to preclude an award of 
damages for both willfulness and pre-judgment interest.16  Given 
this view of the law and the fact that Westinghouse points to no 
unusual circumstances in favor of a discretionary denial of 
pre-judgment interest, we will reverse the district court's 
denial of Starceski's motion for pre-judgment interest and remand 
for a quantification of the pre-judgment interest due him.  See 
Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1530 & n.16 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
                     
16
.  The difficulty with the FLSA incorporation argument is 
compounded by the ADEA requirement of willfulness, which is not 
found in the FLSA. 
  
 B.  Reinstatement 
 Starceski also contends that the district court erred 
in denying his request for reinstatement.  We have held that the 
decision to grant reinstatement or its alternative, front pay, is 
within the sound discretion of the district court.  Maxfield v. 
Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Since 
reinstatement is an equitable remedy, it is the district court 
that should decide whether reinstatement is feasible."), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986). 
 In determining whether to grant either reinstatement or 
front pay, we have suggested that district courts should take 
into consideration the ADEA's purpose to make aggrieved 
plaintiffs whole "by restoring them to the position they would 
have been in had the discrimination never occurred."  Id.  
Although reinstatement "is the preferred remedy to avoid future 
lost earnings" because it is consistent with the ADEA's 
make-whole philosophy, we have concluded that reinstatement is 
not feasible in cases where there "may be no position available 
at the time of judgment or the relationship between the parties 
may have been so damaged by animosity that reinstatement is 
impracticable."  Id. 
 Here, we initially note that Starceski failed to object 
when the trial judge instructed the jury on front pay, even 
though he intended to make a motion for reinstatement.17  
                     
17
.  Neither party raised as an issue on appeal the use of a 
general verdict.  In that verdict, the jury awarded compensatory 
damages of $267,268.55, an amount that appears to include at 
least some element of front pay. 
  
Starceski is not entitled to both reinstatement and front pay.  
In any event, the district court found that reinstatement was not 
a viable option due to the lack of available positions and given 
the animosity between the parties.  We cannot say that finding is 
clearly erroneous.  Moreover, on this record, we see no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's decision to deny Starceski the 
remedy of reinstatement. "The district court was in a much better 
position [than us] to determine whether or not reinstatement was 
feasible based on the testimony and evidence at trial."  
Brunnemann, 975 F.2d at 180.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
district court's denial of Starceski's motion for reinstatement. 
 
 VII.  Conclusion 
 On Westinghouse's appeal, we will affirm the district 
court's order denying Westinghouse's post-trial motions for 
judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, as well as its denial 
of a remittitur. 
 On Starceski's cross-appeal, we will affirm the 
district court's denial of reinstatement but vacate its order 
denying pre-judgment interest and remand this case to the 
district court for the addition of pre-judgment interest due 
Starceski to the judgment in his favor.  Each party shall bear 
its own costs.  
  
Starceski v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Nos. 94-3182 & 94-3208 
GARTH, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting, 
 I agree with the court that the jury verdict finding 
Westinghouse liable for an ADEA violation should be sustained.  I 
cannot agree, however, that the same conduct charged to 
Westinghouse and found to violate the ADEA, without more, 
justified a finding that Westinghouse was willful in its 
violation of the ADEA, resulting in the imposition of a 
liquidated damages award.  The court's holding today leads 
ineluctably to the conclusion that every ADEA disparate treatment 
violation will also constitute a willful violation that permits a 
liquidated damages award.   
 I cannot agree with such a holding and I accordingly 
dissent from so much of the majority's opinion as affirms the 
award of liquidated damages against Westinghouse.18 
 
 I. 
 The ADEA provides for liquidated damages of twice the 
backpay award when an employer's violation of the ADEA is 
"willful."  29 U.S.C. § 626(b).   Congress added this penalty as 
                     
18
.    For purposes of clarity, I not only concur in the court's 
affirmance of the jury verdict as to the ADEA violation, but I 
agree as well that we should uphold the district court's rulings 
which denied Starceski reinstatement and which denied remittitur.  
Because my reading of the record and of Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993), causes me to conclude that no 
liquidated damages should have been awarded against Westinghouse, 
I would vacate the award of liquidated damages and remand for a 
determination of prejudgment interest. 
  
a deterrent to knowing misconduct by employers.  113 Cong. Rec. 
2199 (1967) (comments of Senator Javits). 
 Unfortunately, the term "willful" has eluded easy or 
precise definition.  The difficulties which have attended the 
effort to define willfulness have resulted in numerous and 
sometimes conflicting decisions on the meaning and application of 
§ 626(b).  See 2 Howard C. Eglitt, Age Discrimination § 8.30 (2d 
ed. 1993).  Nonetheless, while the courts of appeals have adopted 
different standards at different times, the courts have 
consistently adhered to two principles to resolve disputes under 
§ 626(b).   
 First, courts have consistently acknowledged that 
Congress intended only some violations of the ADEA to be willful. 
 Second, courts have been careful not to punish good 
faith efforts by employers to comply with the Act.   
 Today's decision by the majority ignores both of those 
principles. 
 This appeal represents this court's first 
interpretation of willfulness since Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 113 
S. Ct. 1701 (1993).  Hazen represents the Supreme Court's latest 
restatement of the standard for willful violations.  The 
majority's disregard of the two established principles of 
interpretation under the ADEA, which I have identified, is 
therefore all the more troubling. 
 Before I discuss those principles and the majority's 
failure to apply these principles in its analysis of the 
Starceski record, I should explain that I have no quarrel with 
  
the court's statement that willfulness exists when an employer 
"knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its 
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA."  Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1710.  
Rather, I strongly disagree with the majority's application of 
this standard in the present appeal -- an application that makes 
every ADEA violation a willful violation and ignores the good 
faith attempts of an employer to comply with its statutory 
duties. 
 
 II. 
 The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have 
repeatedly recognized that Congress did not intend every 
violation of the ADEA to be a willful violation.  In Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), the Supreme 
Court rejected Thurston's argument that a violation was willful 
whenever the employer knew the ADEA was "in the picture" because 
that standard would eliminate the distinction between ordinary 
and willful violations.   
 [T]he broad standard proposed by [Thurston] 
would result in an award of double damages in 
almost every case.  As employers are required 
to post ADEA notices, it would be virtually 
impossible for an employer to show that he 
was unaware of the Act and its potential 
applicability.  Both the legislative history 
and the structure of the statute show that 
Congress intended a two-tiered liability 
scheme.  We decline to interpret the 
liquidated damages provision of ADEA § 7(b) 
in a manner that frustrates this intent. 
Id. at 128 (footnote omitted).  Rather than adopt Thurston's 
standard, the Court concluded that willfulness may be proved when 
  
the employer "knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of 
whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA."  Id. at 126 
(quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Tran World Airlines, 713 F.2d 
940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983).  As the Supreme Court explained in 
Hazen, the principle adopted in Thurston, which it labeled the 
two-tiered liability principle, distinguishes between ordinary 
and willful violations: 
 The two-tiered liability principle was simply 
one interpretive tool among several that we 
used in Thurston to decide what Congress 
meant by the word "willful," and in any event 
we continue to believe that the "knowledge or 
reckless disregard" standard will create two 
tiers of liability across the range of ADEA 
cases.  It is not true that an employer who 
knowingly relies on age in reaching its 
decision invariably commits a knowing or 
reckless violation of the ADEA. 
Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1709. 
 Three years after Thurston, the Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to reconsider the principle of two-tiered liability 
in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), a case 
involving the statute of limitations under the FLSA.  The FLSA 
provides for a three year statute of limitations following 
willful violations as compared to the ordinary two year statute 
of limitations.  29 U.S.C. § 255(a).  The Court refused to 
abandon either the knowledge or reckless disregard standard or 
the principle that some but not all violations will be willful.  
"The fact that Congress did not simply extend the limitations 
period to three years, but instead adopted a two-tiered statute 
of limitations, makes it obvious that Congress intended to draw a 
  
significant distinction between ordinary violations and willful 
violations."  486 U.S. at 132.  A lower standard would 
"obliterate[] any distinction between willful and nonwillful 
violations" by adopting a more lenient standard.  Id. at 132-33. 
 The Supreme Court in Hazen cautioned against abandoning 
the principle of two-tiered liability.  Willful violations only 
extend to knowing or reckless violations of the ADEA, whether 
they result from formal or informal policies.  113 S. Ct. at 
1709.  The Court repeated that "Congress aimed to create a `two-
tiered liability scheme,' under which some but not all ADEA 
violations would give rise to liquidated damages."  Id. at 1708 
(quoting Thurston, 469 U.S. at 127).  Further, the Court took 
pains to demonstrate why the Thurston standard does not result in 
liquidated damages in every case.  Id. at 1709.   
 
 III. 
 The principle of two-tiered liability has not stood 
alone as an interpretive guide to the meaning of § 626(b) of the 
ADEA.  Courts have also been guided by a desire to encourage good 
faith attempts at compliance with the ADEA.   
 In Thurston, the Court stressed this when it held that 
TWA had not acted willfully, despite the adoption of a policy 
which explicitly disadvantaged older workers, when the airline 
believed the policy was a permissible bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ).  The Court concluded that "[i]t is 
reasonable to believe that the [company and its lawyers], in 
focusing on the larger overall problem, simply overlooked the 
  
challenged aspect of the new plan."  469 U.S. at 130.  Thus, 
TWA's violation did not warrant liquidated damages.  A company is 
not liable for liquidated damages when it "act[s] reasonably and 
in good faith in attempting to determine whether [its] plan would 
violate the ADEA."  Id. at 129. 
 The Court in Hazen also acknowledged the importance of 
a company's good faith efforts to comply with the law.  "If an 
employer incorrectly but in good faith and nonrecklessly believes 
that the statute permits a particular age-based decision, then 
liquidated damages should not be imposed."  113 S. Ct. at 1709. 
 The relevance of an employer's good faith has been 
repeatedly recognized by the courts of appeals.  See, e.g., 
Schrad v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 851 F.2d 152, 158 (6th 
Cir. 1988); Gilliam v. Amtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390 (4th Cir. 
1987); Whitfield v. City of Knoxville, 756 F.2d 455, 463 (6th 
Cir. 1985). 
 
 IV. 
 Despite courts' consistent use of these principles to 
guide the interpretation of § 626(b), the majority here fails to 
acknowledge or apply either.  This failure unfortunately is not 
harmless because here the majority's conclusion that Starceski is 
entitled to liquidated damages does violence to both.   
  
 A. 
 If we adopt the majority's view of willfulness, every 
successful disparate treatment case under the ADEA will also be 
treated as a willful violation.  According to the court, the 
evidence that establishes willfulness is the testimony that 
Jaafar, Starceski's supervisor, told Saul that Jaafar intended to 
discharge senior engineers and directed Saul to lower certain 
employee's performance evaluations.  While Westinghouse contends 
that Jaafar's statement referred to the company's job category 
"Senior Engineer A" and not to older employees, the jury could 
certainly have believed Starceski's assertion that Jaafar was 
actually referring to older engineers.  Hence, the jury had 
grounds to decide that Jaafar, a Westinghouse supervisor, 
intentionally discharged Starceski because of his age -- a 
violation of the ADEA.19 
                     
19
.    I deliberately do not address the issue of whether 
Jaafar's conduct could be attributed to Westinghouse.  I do not 
do so because, even if we assume that Jaafar was speaking for 
Westinghouse, Jaafar's statements do not demonstrate that 
Westinghouse either knew or showed reckless disregard for its 
duties under the ADEA.  Even though the jury may have found that 
Jaafar may have discriminated against Starceski on the basis of 
Starceski's age, that finding does not constitute proof that 
Jaafar or Westinghouse knew that Jaafar's choices in selecting 
employees for discharge violated the Act, even if Jaafar was 
generally aware of the Act.  See Brown v. Stites Concrete, Inc., 
994 F.2d 553, 560 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) ("[I]t is a willful 
violation as opposed to voluntary conduct in general that is 
required."); Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834, 837 
7th Cir. 1988) ("the term 'knew' . . . refers to the fact that 
the employer knew he was violating the ADEA, not to the fact that 
he was aware of the Act.").  Further evidence of willfulness is 
necessary. 
  
 However, the existence of an intent to act on the basis 
of age, the sine qua non of an ADEA disparate treatment case, 
cannot by itself also be the determinant of willfulness.  Such a 
rule extinguishes any distinction between an ordinary disparate 
treatment case and a willful violation.  Every ADEA plaintiff who 
claims disparate treatment must prove that the employer 
intentionally acted on the basis of the plaintiff's age.  Hazen, 
113 S. Ct. at 1706-07; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. 
Ct. 2742, 2748, 2751, 2756 (1993); Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 
F.3d 428, 432-33 (3d Cir. 1994); Colgan v. Fischer Scientific 
Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1417 (3d Cir. 1991).  Disparate treatment 
cases are far and away the largest proportion of ADEA cases 
brought in the courts.  Congress surely did not intend to permit 
an award of liquidated damages in every one of these cases. 
 The resulting tension is not solved by the court's 
statement that evidence of intent by itself is reasonable 
evidence that Westinghouse "`knew or showed reckless disregard' 
for its statutory duty to avoid discriminating against Starceski 
because of his age."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 19.  This assertion 
does not "draw a significant distinction between ordinary 
violations and willful violations."  McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 132. 
 If, as the majority apparently believes, intent and 
willfulness are the same under the ADEA, it is virtually 
impossible for a defendant to defend against a claim of 
willfulness apart from its defense against the plaintiff's 
underlying ADEA claim.  Moreover, it reduces the two-tiered 
  
liability principle to a single-tiered determination that the 
ADEA has been violated. 
 
 B. 
 Similarly, the majority ignores almost entirely 
Westinghouse's proof of its good faith effort to avoid a 
violation of age or race discrimination laws during its reduction 
in force.  The majority misconstrues Westinghouse's argument as 
an attempt to show that the violation "resulted from no more than 
accident, inadvertence or ordinary negligence."  Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 18.  Westinghouse argues not that the violation was 
accidental but that Westinghouse did not recklessly disregard its 
duties under the Act as revealed by its review of its employment 
decisions to prevent employment discrimination.   
 Contrary to the majority, I believe the record reflects 
Westinghouse's reasonable, if unsuccessful, effort to prevent 
discrimination.  As Hazen and Thurston discuss, this good faith 
effort makes a liquidated damages award inappropriate.  "If an 
employer incorrectly but in good faith and nonrecklessly believes 
that the statute permits a particular age-based decision, then 
liquidated damages should not be imposed."  Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 
1709. 
 Once Westinghouse decided that it would need to lay off 
some employees, Westinghouse counseled all of its managers to 
choose employees based only on business reasons.  App. 486.  Once 
the managers chose candidates for lay off, each manager was 
required to give reasons for his or her decisions.  App. 487.  
  
Two human resources employees and the company's legal counsel 
reviewed these justifications for possible discrimination.  App. 
487.   
 According to these company reports, Starceski was 
chosen because the company lacked work in his division.  App. 
488.  Westinghouse human resources personnel confirmed this 
characterization with Mr. Jaafar's manager, Mr. Esposito.  App. 
490.  Starceski does not dispute that a number of projects in 
Westinghouse's Nuclear Services Division were terminated or being 
wound up during the time period in which he was laid off.  These 
facts gave Westinghouse personnel more reason to credit Jaafar's 
representation.  Though Westinghouse did not investigate Jaafar's 
and Esposito's statements further, the circumstances disclosed by 
the record gave Westinghouse every reason to believe that the 
sole reason for Starceski's discharge was the lack of work in his 
department. 
 Given the importance of good faith to our prior 
interpretations, willfulness is surely not demonstrated simply by 
showing that Westinghouse informed its managers of the ADEA and 
proof that an ADEA violation occurred.  Thurston itself declined 
to hold "that a violation of the Act is `willful' if the employer 
simply knew of the potential applicability of the ADEA."  469 
U.S. at 127; see also Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 
712, 721 (1st Cir. 1994) ("A finding of willfulness requires 
something more than merely showing that an employer knew about 
the ADEA and its potential applicability in the workplace."). 
  
 Nothing in this record leads to a conclusion that 
Westinghouse recklessly disregarded the rights of its older 
employees.  Everything points to a conclusion that Westinghouse 
"acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting to determine 
whether [its] plan would violate the ADEA."  Thurston, 469 U.S. 
at 129.  In Starceski's case unfortunately, its internal efforts 
were unsuccessful. 
 Unlike the majority, however, I would not punish 
Westinghouse twice for its failure, once through a backpay award 
and again through a liquidated damages award.  Such a policy does 
nothing to encourage companies to scrutinize closely their 
employment decisions and policies.  While a company's inability 
to protect perfectly against age discrimination is grounds to 
award backpay and restitution so that an employee is fully 
compensated, it does not warrant doubling the award.   
 
 V. 
 Willfulness, as defined by Thurston, focuses on a 
company's knowledge of or reckless disregard for whether its 
actions violate the ADEA.  Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 721-22 
("Willfulness, then requires an element akin to reckless 
disregard of, or deliberate indifference to, an employer's ADEA-
related obligations.");  Brown v. Stites Concrete, Inc., 994 F.2d 
553, 560 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) ("[I]t is a willful violation 
of the law as opposed to voluntary conduct in general that is 
required."); Benjamin v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 873 F.2d 
41, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (Willfulness occurs when employer has been 
  
"indifferent to the requirements of the governing statute and 
acted in a purposeful, deliberate, or calculated fashion."); 
Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 1988) 
("The term `knew' . . . refers to the fact that the employer knew 
he was violating the ADEA, not to the fact that he was aware of 
the Act.").  Willfulness is not a matter of additional evidence 
but a matter of additional misconduct.  See Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 
1709; Kelly v. Mattlock, 903 F.2d 978, 982 (3d Cir. 1990).   
 An employer who pays no attention to its duties under 
the Act does so at the risk of paying double the penalty for any 
resulting violations.  An employer who goes forward with an 
employment decision when it knows that its actions illegally 
discriminate against older workers likewise risks the imposition 
of liquidated damages.  When awarded under these circumstances, 
liquidated damages serve as a necessary and beneficial deterrent 
to ADEA violations.  Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125-26. 
 On the other hand, an employer's or a supervisor's 
intentional use of age in an employment decision, while 
completely adequate grounds for an ordinary ADEA award, does not 
by itself suffice to find that the employer knowingly pursued an 
unlawful course of conduct or recklessly disregarded its 
statutory duties.  To so hold is to eliminate the ADEA's two-
tiered liability scheme and to overlook Westinghouse's good faith 
efforts to prevent an ADEA violation.   
 Because I fear that today's decision by the court 
operates to merge both tiers of the two-tiered liability 
principle into one -- i.e. a mere disparate treatment violation 
  
of the ADEA -- and because I cannot support the court's disregard 
for these principles which have consistently guided our 
interpretation of the ADEA, I respectfully dissent from the 
court's affirmance of the district court's award of liquidated 
damages.20 
                     
20
.    Because I would not award liquidated damages, I would 
remand the case for a determination of prejudgment interest.  
Such an order would obviate any conflict between liquidated 
damages and prejudgment interest.  Forced to choose between an 
award of both liquidated damages and prejudgment interest, I 
would permit only one sanction because I believe, as we have 
held, that liquidated damages serve both compensatory and 
punitive functions.  Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 
382 (3d Cir. 1987).  In doing so, I would join the majority of 
courts of appeals that have considered the question since 
Thurston.  See Powers v. Grinnel Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 40-41 (1st 
Cir. 1990); Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 165-66 
(4th Cir. 1990); Burns v. Texas City Refining, Inc., 890 F.2d 
747, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1989); Coston v. Plitt Theaters, Inc., 831 
F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 485 
U.S. 1007 (1988). 
